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RECENT CASES
Injunctions-Contempt Power-Citation Proper Against
Nonparty Who Violates Court Order in School Desegregation Case
On March 5, 1972, the sheriff of Jacksonville and the superintendent of the Duval County schools filed with the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida a petition for injunctive relief,
alleging that appellant Eric Hall and other adult "outsiders" were engaged in a deliberate attempt to prohibit. Jacksonville's Ribault Senior
High School from functioning as an educational institution and to prevent the Duval County School Board from complying with a desegregation order issued by the court.' On the same day, the district court, in

an ex parte proceeding, entered an order prohibiting all unauthorized
outsiders from going upon the grounds or into the buildings of the high
school. 2 Hall and six other adult outsiders were served with copies of
the order, although none was a party to the original desegregation litigation or named as a party in the order. On March 9, 1972, Hall appeared
on the Ribault campus for the stated purpose of violating the court
order and was duly arrested and taken into custody by a United States

marshal. After a nonjury trial, the district court found Hall guilty of
criminal contempt and sentenced him to 60 days' imprisonment. On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Hall
I. The original desegregation order was entered on June 23, 1971. Mims v. Duval County
School Bd., 329 F. Supp. 123 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1971). After this order
had been put into effect, increasing racial unrest and violence among the students at Ribault Senior
High School brought "meaningful and orderly instruction" to a standstill. Mims v. Duval County
School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
2. The order provided in relevant part: 2. Until further order of this Court, no person shall
enter any building of the Ribault Senior High School or go upon the school's grounds except the
following: (a) Students of Ribault Senior High School while attending classes or official school
functions. (b) The faculty, staff, and administration of Ribault Senior High School and other
employees of the Duval County School Board having assigned duties at the school. (c) Persons
having business obligations which require their presence on the school's premises. (d) Parents of
Ribault Senior High School students or any other person who has the prior permission of the
principal or his designee to be present on the school's premises. (e) Law enforcement officials of
the City of Jacksonville, the State of Florida or the United States Government.
6. Anyone having notice of this order who violates any of the terms thereof shall be subject
to arrest, prosecution and punishment by imprisonment or fine, or both, for criminal contempt
under the laws of the United States of America .
Mims v. Duval County School Bd., 338
F. Supp. 1208, 1209-10 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
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argued that his nonparty status put him beyond the proper reach of the

court's order under both the traditional rules of federal equity jurisprudence 3 and the specific provisions of Rule 65(d)4 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The circuit court rejected both contentions and held,
affirmed. A district court may punish for criminal contempt a nonparty
who knowingly violates a court order designed to protect the court's
judgment in a school desegregation case. United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d

261 (5th Cir. 1972).
Whether an injunction or other order binds one not a party to the
underlying suit or proceeding so that he may be held in contempt 5 for
violation is a question that always has troubled the courts. Some early
cases purported to announce a sweeping and apparently absolute
rule-that an injunction or other order does not bind nonparties., The
principle underlying this rule is that due process forbids a court to

adjudicate the legal rights and relationships of a person who has not had
the opportunity to be heard before the court.7 Further, a court arguably
usurps the role of the legislature if it assumes to prescribe a rule of
conduct for persons not properly before it.' Observers also recognized
at an early date, however, that if all nonparties remained unaffected by
3. See notes 12-20 infra & accompanying text.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) provides in part: "Every order granting an injunction and every
restraining order. . . is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who
receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise." See notes 20-27 infra &
accompanying text.
5. There is general agreement that courts have inherent power to punish contempt of court
by fines or imprisonment. See Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873); United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). The contempt power of the federal courts
presently is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). In general, a contempt proceeding is "civil" if it is
remedial in nature and designed to coerce obedience or to compensate the complainant for losses
sustained; it is "criminal" if its purpose is to vindicate the court's authority and dignity. However,
few courts have been able to distinguish satisfactorily civil and criminal contempt. See Goldfarb,
The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 44, 57 (1961). See generally
Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 780 (1943). In the
instant case, Hall was charged with criminal contempt.
6. For Lord Eldon, the rule was unbending: "I have no conception, that it is competent to
this Court to hold a man bound by an injunction, who is not a party in the cause for the purpose
of the cause." Iveson v. Harris, 32 Eng. Rep. 102, 104 (Ch. 1802). See Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S.
107, 117 (1897) (binding nonparties does not comport with "well-settled principles of equity procedure").
7. Harris v. Hardeman, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 334, 339-40 (1852); Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S.
(I
1 How.) 437, 459-60 (1850); see Note, Contempt by Strangers to a Federal Court Decree, 43
VA. L. REV. 1294, 1297 (1957).
8. See Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 250 (1971); Dunbar,
Government by Injunction, 13 L.Q. REv.347, 362-63 (1897); Gregory, Government by Injunction,
11 HARV. L. REV.487, 501-02 (1898). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION 82-89, 123-33 (1930).
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a court order in all situations, nonparties could thwart the order's purpose by acting independently or, more importantly, by acting on behalf
of a party. These fears impelled some early courts to state broadly that
all persons having knowledge of an order are bound not to violate it
In some cases this broad language seems unwarranted by the facts; 0 in
others, the holding is based upon the flexible principle that a nonparty
who knowingly violates or interferes with a court order creates an "obstruction to the orderly and effective administration of justice", and is
in contempt of court. Despite such broad language, most early courts
looked to the nonparty's relationship to the injunction defendant in
2
deciding whether the injunction or other order should be held binding.
The decrees were therefore held to bind the agents and employees of an
enjoined party, because the courts found agents and employees adequately represented at the injunction proceeding by their principals or
employers.' 3 Similarly, court orders were found binding upon nonparties who aided and abetted the injunction defendant in violating the
order.' In 1930, the leading case of Alemite Manufacturing Corp. v.
Staffl apparently settled the circumstances under which an injunction
binds a nonparty. In Alemite, the court had enjoined Staff's employer
from infringing Alemite's patent; after the injunction issued, Staff severed all relationship with his former employer and began infringing the
patent. The district court held Staff in contempt for violating the origi9. See, e.g., In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 554 (1897); Chisolm v. Caines, 121 F. 397, 401-02
(C.C.D.S.C. 1903); In re Reese, 107 F. 942, 945 (8th Cir. 1901).
10. In In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897), for example, Lennon, although not a party, was
an employee of the injunction defendant. Therefore, a more accurate holding would have been that
an employee is bound by an injunction properly issued against his employer. Cf. United States
Playing-Card Co. v. Spalding, 92 F. 368, 369 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899) (discussing the breadth of the
holding in Lennon).
II. In re Reese, 107 F. 942, 945 (8th Cir. 1901). Critics have challenged the "obstruction of
justice" theory as ignoring the more basic question whether the order should affect the nonparty
at all. See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1028-29 (1965). Other
writers have approved the theory. See Note, supranote 7, at 1299; cf. Frankfurter & Landis, Power
of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in
Separationof Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1022-23 (1924).
12. For a catalogue of the various party-nonparty relationships and their effects see Note,
Binding Nonparties to Injunction Decrees, 49 MINN. L. REv. 719 (1965).
13. See, e.g., Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 746, 750 (C.C.N.D.
Ohio), appealdismissedsub nom. In re Lennon, 150 U.S. 393 (1893). One who is the employee of
an enjoined party at the time the order is issued but who later severs all relationship with the
injunction defendant no longer is bound by the order. Harvey v. Bettis, 35 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1929);
Mexican Ore Co. v. Mexican Guadalupe Mining Co., 47 F. 351 (C.C.D.N.J. 1891).
14. See, e.g., W.B. Conkey Co. v. Russell, 111 F. 417 (C.C.D. Ind. 1901), appealdismissed
sub nora. Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 133 F. 165 (7th Cir. 1904); cf. Lawson v. United States,
297 F. 418 (8th Cir. 1924).
15. 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930).
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nal injunction. In reversing, the circuit court, speaking through Judge

Learned Hand, held that an injunction only binds parties, those who
abet a party in violating the injunction, and those legally identified with
a party. 6 Furthermore, the court held that insofar as a decree purports
to bind others, it is "pro tanto brutum fulmen." 17 Finally, Judge Hand
noted that "it is not the act described which the decree may forbid, but
only that act when the defendant does it."'" Four years later, in Chase
National Bank v. City of Norwalk," the Supreme Court substantially
adopted the principles announced by Judge Hand, as a matter of equity

jurisdiction and procedure. Additionally, these principles constitute the
"common-law doctrine" that is the basis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d),20 which explicitly delineates the binding effect of federal
injunctions and restraining orders. Rule 65(d) is apparently mandatory,
requiring compliance by all federal courts,2' and although failure to
comply with the Rule may not render the injunction void, a material
departure from its terms may warrant vacation or reversal.22 Judicial
23
fidelity to Rule 65(d) in general has been consistent and scrupulous.
Even though Rule 65(d) by its terms allows no exceptions to its coverage, and despite the Supreme Court rule that the Federal Rules are to
be followed in bankruptcy cases24 "as nearly as may be, ' 25 there always
16. One commentator has suggested that Judge Hand's sweeping language should be limited
to factual contexts in which a relatively unimportant personal property right is infringed and the
deliberateness of the defendant's conduct is uncertain. That commentator believes that, in cases
like the instant one, Alemite should constitute no bar to holding the nonparty in contempt. Note,
The Range of FederalInjunctions, 6 UTAH L. REV. 363, 376 & n.105 (1959).
17. 42 F.2d at 832.
18. Id. at 833.
19. 291 U.S. 431 (1934). In this case plaintiff sought an injunction to forbid the removal
from the city streets of certain equipment belonging to it. The injunction ran not only against the
city of Norwalk, but also against "all persons to whom notice of the order of injunction should
come." Id. at 436. The Court found the order invalid insofar as it purported to bind persons not
parties nor associates or confederates of parties.
20. See Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13-14 (1945). Rule 65(d) actually is based
on § 19 of the Clayton Act, which in turn was declaratory of common law. See NLRB v. Blackstone Mfg. Co., 123 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1941). Section 19 was repealed in 1948 for the stated reason
that it was covered by Rule 65(d). See 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.01110] n.6 (2d ed.
1972). For the text of Rule 65(d) see note 4 supra.
21. See 7 J. MOORE, supra note 20,
65.11.
22. See id. 1 65.11 & n.6.
23. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (nonparties
bound only within scope of Rule 65(d)); Le Tourneau Co. v. NLRB, 150 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1945)
(same); Baltz v. The Fair, 178 F. Supp. 691 (N.D. II1. 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1960)
(same); cf.Consolidation Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners, 442 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 911 (1971) (court must be diligent in following Rule 65).
24. The Federal Rules as a whole are not directly applicable to proceedings in bankruptcy.
See 7 J. MOORE, supra note 20, 1 65.02[3].
25. General Order 37, 11 U.S.C. app. at 2211 (1970). The Supreme Court promulgated the
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has been an exception to Rule 65(d) for bankruptcy cases. Perhaps as a
result of the qualifying language in the Court rule, it is well established
that courts may issue an in rem injunction binding on all persons-parties and nonparties alike. 6 In nonbankruptcy cases, however,
Rule 65(d) has been, with few exceptions, 7 an effective limitation on the
scope of federal court injunctions.
In the instant case, the court first found Alemite and Chase National Bank distinguishable: in each case, the nonparty's act, however

damaging to the plaintiff, did not affect the injunction defendant's duty
and ability to comply with the injunction, nor did it threaten the plain-

tiff's rights against the defendant as adjudicated by the court. In the
instant case, however, the court found that Hall's acts threatened to
prevent the school board from performing its constitutional duty to
desegregate the Jacksonville school system and threatened to deprive

the students of their constitutional right to attend integrated schools.
The court therefore concluded that Hall's acts had imperiled the district
court's power to render an effective judgment in the case before it and
that, under the authority of United States v. UMW, 8 a case in which

substantial doubt of the court's statutory power to issue an injunction
was held not to bar issuance of a temporary restraining order,29 the
district court had inherent jurisdictional power to issue an order, binding
on all persons, to protect its ability to render an effective judgment. As
an alternative rationale, the court analogized desegregation cases to in

rem proceedings-in both cases the court's judgment is peculiarly susceptible to interference by an a priori undefinable class of persons.
General Orders under § 30 of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 30 subsequently was repealed and a
new rule-making procedure authorized. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970). See generally 2 J. MOORE,
supra note 20, 1 1.03[2].
26. See, e.g., In re Lustron Corp., 184 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 946
(1951); It re George F. Nord Bldg. Corp., 129 F.2d 173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 670
(1942); Zeleznik v. Grand Riviera Theater Co., 128 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1942); Converse v. Highway
Constr. Co., 107 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1939).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Dean Rubber Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Mo. 1946), in
which it was said that an injunction against the distribution of defective prophylactics would be in
rem. The statement seems to be a dictum unrelated to the actual decision of the case. See Dobbs,
supra note 8, at 257 n.305.
28. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
29. In UMW, the district court issued an ex parte restraining order forbidding defendant
union to call a strike. The union called a strike, believing that under § 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970), the district court was without jurisdiction to issue the order. In
affirming the union's contempt conviction, the Supreme Court apparently held the union bound
to obey the order even if the district court were found to be without jurisdiction to issue it. For
discussions of the UMW case see Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 364-80 (1950); Cox,
The Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 86, 100-15 (1948). See notes 34-40
infra & accompanying text.
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Therefore the instant court said that in both cases, in order to protect
its judgment, the court has broad and flexible powers to issue orders
binding on all persons and to punish for contempt those who violate the

orders.30 The court further noted that because Rule 65(d) merely codifies the common-law doctrine of the effect of injunctions on nonparties, 31 and because federal courts had power at common law to issue in

rem injunctions and had continued to do so under the Rule, the district
court had the power, in the analogous school desegregation situation,
to issue orders binding on all persons, notwithstanding Rule 65(d). Al-

though it conceded that injunctive relief ordinarily requires a hearing,
and that there was no hearing in the instant case, the court overcame

this apparent impropriety by characterizing the instant order as a tem-3

porary restraining order, which may issue ex parte under Rule 65(b). 1
Although the result in the instant case seems just,3 3 the reasoning
of the court is unconvincing and could set an unfortunate precedent. For
example, the court's first alternative ground of decision-that courts of
equity have inherent jurisdictional power to issue binding orders to
protect their judgments-seems unsupported by precedent. In United
States v. UMW,34 upon which the court relied heavily, the issue was

the court's ability to enter binding orders despite its lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, but in the instant case the court purported to issue

an order binding persons over whom it had not acquired personal jurisdiction.35 Authorities generally agree that courts should not invoke the

UMW doctrine to remedy a lack of personal jurisdiction, 36 and it seems
unwise to extend a doubtful precedent to encroach upon fundamental

individual rights. Furthermore, the intrinsic authoritative effect of the
30. The Supreme Court has recognized the unusual breadth and flexibility of a district
court's equitable powers in a school desegregation case. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
31. See note 20 supra & accompanying text.
32. The court found support for this characterization in the fact that Hall violated the order
4 days after its issuance, well within the 10-day limit for temporary restraining orders. For a
discussion of the requirements of Rule 65(b) see 7 J. MOORE, supra note 20, 11 65.05-.07.
33. Hall was fully aware of the order, his only apparent purpose in violating the order was
to flout the authority of the court, and the order was designed to serve the broad public interest.
Cf note 16 supra.
34. 330 U.S. 258 (1947). See note 29 supra.
35. The distinction seems fundamental. Subject-matter jurisdiction represents the governmental allocation of judicial tasks and spheres of competence among the various courts; being
before the wrong court ordinarily will not prejudice the individual litigant. Personal jurisdiction,
however, reflects the individual's basic right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before his
legal relationships are adjudicated. See note 7 supra & accompanying text.
36. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 29, at 374; Rodgers, The Elusive Search for the Void
Injunction: Res JudicataPrinciplesin Criminal Contempt Proceedings,49 B.U.L. REv. 251, 27273 (1969).
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UMW decision is uncertain because of the sharp division among the

justices deciding it." Finally, the Supreme Court may have repudiated
UMW in In re Green,38 a case that the instant court apparently did not
consider. In Green, a state court had issued a restraining order pending
its determination whether the National Labor Relations Act had pre-

empted state-court jurisdiction. The Court reversed a contempt conviction, holding that a state court is without power to issue a binding order
if federal legislation in fact has pre-empted its jurisdiction. On its facts,
In re Green cannot be distinguished from UMW, 39 which therefore

must be considered severely weakened, if not overruled." The instant
court's characterization of school desegregation cases as in rem actions

is also of questionable propriety. Courts ordinarily invoke in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate right and title to real or other tangible property;
they ordinarily do not use it, as in the instant case, to regulate conduct."
The in rem injunction, as used in the instant case, is objectionable
essentially because it adjudicates individual rights without affording a
hearing to the individual and because it gives the court overly broad
power to prescribe a rule of conduct for all the world. Moreover, the

cases cited by the court in support of the district court's assumption of
in rem jurisdiction were, with but one exception, 2 bankruptcy proceedings. The obvious factual dissimilarity between the administration of a

bankrupt's assets and the desegregation of a school system makes the
former a dubious precedent for the latter.13 Finally, the court's rechar-

acterization of the district court's order as a temporary restraining order
is inconsistent with Rule 65(b), which requires that a restraining order
37. Only 5 of 9 justices thought there is a duty to obey an order if the court later is found
to have been without jurisdiction; of these 5, however, 3 thought the court below had jurisdiction
over the case. As Professor Chafee points out, there is "a lack of impressive solidity on this point
." Z. CHAFEE, supra note 29, at 367.
38. 369 U.S. 889 (1962).
39. In a footnote, the Green Court found UMW distinguishable because it "involved a
restraining order of a federal court and presented no question of pre-emption of a field by Congress
where, if the federal policy is to prevail, federal power must be complete." 369 U.S. at 692 n.l. It
is hard to see why frustration of the policy of the National Labor Relations Act by a state court
is more objectionable than frustration of the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act by a federal court.
40. See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, supra note 11, at 1079.
41. See Dobbs, supra note 8, at 254-58; Note, supra note 12, at 729-31. It would be difficult
to say that the district court's desegregation decree affected any right or title to the school system
or to the underlying racial controversy.
42. United States v. Dean Rubber Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Mo. 1946). See note 27
supra.
43. Furthermore, the court's use of the in rem analogy to escape the confines of Rule 65(d),
see note 31 supra & accompanying text, was improper because the in rem cases under the Rule
were bankruptcy cases, to which it is not certain that the Federal Rules apply at all. See notes 2426 supra & accompanying text.
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expire by its terms within ten days" and that it define the irreparable
injury feared by the applicant." On the other hand, the district court's
order could not be termed a preliminary injunction, because under Rule
65(a) no preliminary injunction may issue without notice to the adverse
party. Whether characterized as a temporary restraining order or as a
preliminary injunction, the district court's order is still defective under
Rule 65(d) because it purported to bind the world at large, rather than
the limited class of persons permitted by the Rule. Given the facts
presented to the instant court, there was probably no way in which the
court reasonably could have reached the result it did within the confines
of precedent and Rule 65. Yet at the district court level a few minor
changes in the papers filed-naming the outsiders as parties defendant
and complying with the procedural requirements of Rule 65(b)-would
have resulted in a valid temporary restraining order binding on Hall and
the six other adult outsiders. Additionally, this procedure would have
satisfied the needs of the school board-presumably Hall and the other
six were the principal instigators of unrest at Ribault Senior High
School, and anyone joining them in disruptive activities would be bound
by the restraining order under the "active concert or participation"
clause of Rule 65(d).46 To permit insubstantial changes in paperwork to
control the validity of an order and thereby to require reversal of an
otherwise just conviction would be a triumph of form over substance
that the instant court could not accept. Nevertheless, reaching the correct result forced the court to strain old principles and articulate new
theories that in the future may be applied to deprive nonparties of the
essential right to participate and be heard in proceedings that adjudicate
their legal relationships.
44. It should be noted that the district court's order was to be in effect "[u]ntil further
order." This does not give the impression of the limited duration inherent in a temporary restraining order.
45. If the court's characterization of the order as a temporary restraining order is accepted,
the court need not have developed the in rem theory, because a temporary restraining order is
binding without a hearing under Rule 65(b). On the other hand, if the in rem rationale is accepted,

the temporary restraining order characterization was unnecessary because an in rem injunction
may be issued ex parte.
46. See Rosenthal, Injunctive Relief Against Campus Disorders, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 746,

762-63 (1970).
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Public Welfare-Federal Court JurisdictionRetroactive Award of Welfare Payments Is Inappropriate Exercise of District Court's General Equity
Jurisdiction and Violates Eleventh Amendment
Plaintiff welfare recipients' brought a class action seeking to enjoin
enforcement 2 of a New York welfare statute, that provided for payment of higher benefits to welfare recipients residing in New York City
than to those residing in the surrounding suburban area, on the ground
that the statute and the regulations promulgated thereunder violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment4 and provisions of
the Social Security Act.5 Pursuant to a favorable judgment on the merits,, plaintiffs submitted a proposed order requiring defendants to award
I. Plaintiffs, recipients of Aid to the Aged, Blind or Disabled (AABD) residing in Nassau
and Westchester Counties, brought suit on behalf of all AABD recipients who resided in the 7county area immediately surrounding New York City. At a later stage in the litigation, the court
granted intervention on behalf of all 7-county recipients of assistance under the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Named as defendants were the Commissioner of the
Department of Social Services of the State of New York and the Department itself.
2. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the statute in question was unlawful, and
preliminary and permanent injunctions against its enforcement. Plaintiffs made no reference at the
time to an award of retroactive payments.
3. On March 31, 1969, the New York Legislature enacted § 131-a of the Social Services
Law, ch. 184, § 5, [1969] N.Y. Laws 217, which established 2 schedules of maximum monthly
grants allowable to welfare recipients, one applicable to New York City and the second to all other
social service districts in the state. Prior to the adoption of § 131-a, the Department of Social
Services had administratively prescribed the standards of public assistance, dividing the state into
3 areas and establishing differentials among them. The 7-county area involved in the instant case
was combined with New York City into a single region. On May 2, 1969, the legislature amended
the recently adopted statute, ch. 411, § 1, [1969] N.Y. Laws 652, to permit the Commissioner of
Social Services to raise or lower the rate schedules for all districts except New York City. The
Commissioner subsequently exercised this authority on June 5, 1969, by raising the 7-county
allowance from $60 to $65 for an individual, and from $183 to $191 for a family of 4 (compared to
$70 and $208, for New York City).
4. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Plaintiffs contended that the statute violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq., 1202(a)(l),
1352(a)(1), 1382(a)(1) (1970). 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(1) provides in part: "A State plan for old-age
assistance. . . must . . . provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State,
" Identical requirements are found
and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them ..
in § 1202(a)(1) (Aid to the Blind); § 1352(a)(1) (Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled);
and § 1382(a)(1) (combined programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind or Disabled and Medical Assistance to the Aged).
6. The 3-judge district court granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of§ 131a, determining that the differential between allowance levels in New York City and the surrounding
area constituted "an arbitrary, invidious and irrational inequality" in violation of plaintiffs' equal
protection rights. Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The court deferred
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retroactively to all class members the payments that had been denied

them under the contested statute. Defendants objected to the proposal,
arguing that the court, in balancing the equities, should give special
consideration to the heavy administrative costs involved in carrying out
the proposed order and to the additional strains it would impose upon
an already overburdened administrative mechanism. 7 Defendants contended further that the instant action, to the extent that it sought retroactive payments, was a suit against the State of New York in violation
of the eleventh amendment of the United States Constitution.8 Plaintiffs
countered that because of the recipients' low incomes, the importance

to them of the admittedly small sums involved outweighed any adverse
impact of retroactive payments upon the state and, moreover, that the

eleventh amendment does not prevent a federal court from providing a
comprehensive remedy for the deprivation of constitutional and statutory rights, including both injunction and retroactive award of benefits.,
The district court adopted plaintiffs' proposal." On appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, reversed. An order
compelling a state to make retroactive payments of public assistance
benefits is both an inappropriate exercise of a federal district court's
general equity jurisdiction and a violation of the eleventh amendment
of the United States Constitution. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3527 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973).
its determination of the alleged violations of the Social Security Act in anticipation of an HEW
ruling. 303 F. Supp. at 351. On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated and
remanded for determination of the statutory grounds in plaintiffs' complaint. Wyman v. Rothstein,
398 U.S. 275 (1970) (per curiam). The Court stated that its recent decision in Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397 (1970), dictated that a federal court called to pass upon the constitutionality of a
state's welfare program should consider first any pendent statutory claims. 398 U.S. at 276. On
remand from the 3-judge court for determination of the statutory claim, a single federal judge ruled
for plaintiffs on the merits and granted their motion for reinstatement of the injunction. Rothstein
v. Wyman, 336 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
7. Defendants submitted, at a later stage, the affidavit of a deputy commissioner in charge
of operations, who estimated that the total costs to the state of the proposed order would be
S1,724,000. Defendants pointed out that much of the retroactive award would go to persons no
longer on the welfare rolls, thereby preventing already inadequate state funds from reaching those
persons whose needs were immediate and urgent.
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
9. Plaintiffs further asserted that New York's acceptance of federal funds under the Social
Security Act for use in its welfare program constituted an implied waiver of its eleventh amendment
immunity.
10. Rothstein v. Wyman, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 15,172 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1971). Final
judgment was not entered until a year later, after the court had considered defendants' requests to
15,237 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
cancel the retroactive order. Rothstein v. Wyman, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP.
25, 1972).
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The categorical assistance programs established under the Social
Act of 193511 are based on a "scheme of cooperative federalSecurity
ism," 1 2 under which the federal government maintains a dominant role

in financing, establishing minimal standards, and determining the overall direction of public assistance programs.13 Against this federal
power, a participating state retains considerable latitude in administering the assistance programs, especially in setting a standard of need and

determining the level of benefits.14 During the early years of categorical
assistance, dissatisfied claimants seldom attempted to secure judicial
review of these state administrative provisions." However, as a result
of the adoption of more liberal class action procedures," the accelerating organization of welfare recipients, 7 the increased availability of
legal assistance to the poor, and the acceptance of welfare benefits as a

statutory entitlement rather than a privilege, 8 the incidence of suits to
correct abuses in state welfare practices has increased appreciably during the past decade." Because victory on the major substantive issues
was of primary importance in the early years of welfare litigation, the
remedial appropriateness of retroactive benefit orders by federal courts
seldom was questioned, and such awards frequently were made as a
matter of course. 2' Thus the cases dealing with retroactive welfare bene-

fits usually have lacked an articulated rationale for either granting or
denying such benefits.2' With the recent resolution of many of the sub1I.42

U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1970). For a general overview of the programs see ADVISORY
AsSOCIATED WITH FEDERAL GRANTS FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE (1964) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY
COMM'N]; Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 326 (1966).
12. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 542 (1972); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
13. See ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 1I,at 27. Each state choosing to apply for assistance
under the categorical programs must submit a state plan for HEW approval; the plan must meet
certain basic qualifications under the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 302, 602, 1202, 1352, 1382 (1970), and
must conform to rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary, id. § 1302.
14. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,478 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 31819 (1968).
15. Note, FederalJudicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 84, 90
(1967).
16. For a discussion of the use of class actions in welfare litigation see P. Nussbaum, How
To Commence Welfare Litigation in Federal Court 45-47 (Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law,
Columbia University, undated).
17. See Note, supra note 15, at 90.
18. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 627 n.6 (1969). See also Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965).
19. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 422 n.23 (1970), and cases therein cited.
20. Levy, The Aftermath of Victory: The Availability of Retroactive Welfare Benefits llegally' Denied, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 253 & n.l (1970).
21. See Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12, 20 (D. Me. 1970), and cases therein cited; cf.
COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
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stantive questions, however, judicial focus is shifting to the propriety of
retroactive awards. 2 Employment of this remedy by the federal courts
has been attacked on two distinct grounds: as an improper exercise of
the courts' general equity jurisdiction and as a violation of the eleventh
amendment of the United States Constitution. Under general equitable

principles, the courts have consciously examined the litigants' interests
in the grant or denial of retroactive benefits to determine where the
preponderance of the equities lies. In Bryson v. Burson,2 3 a federal

district court balanced plaintiffs' financial needs and diligence in bringing the action24 against the potential economic and administrative burden that a retroactive order would place on the state, and, finding the

remedy to be within its equitable discretion, compromised by awarding
payments retroactive to the date on which the action was filed.2 5 An

opposite conclusion was reached, after weighing similar factors, by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bryant v. Carleson.21Assuming that
it possessed the authority to make a retroactive award, 27 the court reasoned that the state's prior unlawful conduct, 28 together with the plight
of the welfare recipients who were denied payments, nevertheless could

not justify endangering the state's already troubled fiscal position. 9
Although very few courts have articulated this equity analysis," even
Fontaine, The ConstitutionalLaw of Remedies in Welfare Litigation, 23 MAINE L. REv. 41, 4243 (1971).
22. Levy, supra note 20, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. at 6. The purpose of seeking retroactive
benefits is twofold: to recompense the welfare recipient for benefits wrongfully denied him, often
providing the means for his continued subsistence, and to deter intentional wrongdoing by state
welfare administrators. Id., 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. at 253.
23. 308 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Ga. 1969). The case originated as a class action by plaintiffs
challenging the constitutionality of the residency requirements of Georgia welfare statutes.
24. See Machado v. Hackney, 299 F. Supp. 644, 646 (W.D. Tex. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S.
593 (1970).
25. 308 F. Supp. at 1174.
26. 465 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1972). The suit arose as a class action by AFDC recipients
challenging California's failure to increase dollar maximums under its AFDC program.
27. The court assumed arguendothat it possessed the jurisdiction and power to order retroactive payments, but expressed serious doubt as to whether such authority actually existed. Id. at
114.
28. The court stated that there was no question that the state had continued to receive federal
funds "'in flagrant violation and disregard of Federal law....'"
Id. at 113. Other courts have
considered the need to deter such official lawlessness as a factor to weigh in determining whether
to award retroactive payments. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Schmidt, 317 F. Supp. 1027, 1042 (W.D.
Wis. 1970).
29. 465 F.2d at 114. The court was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that retroactive
payments would have cost the state approximately $90,000,000. For a similar case denying retroactive benefits because of their financial burden on the state see Robinson v. Hackney, 307 F. Supp.
1249 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
30. Cf. note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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fewer have explored the constitutional argument. The eleventh amend-

ment, 31 which has been construed to prohibit nonconsensual suits
against a state by its own citizens in the federal courts, 3 1 applies both
to actions in which the state itself is a party and to those involving other
parties in which satisfaction of the resulting judgment would require an
expenditure of state funds. 33 In Ex parte Young, 34 however, the Su-

preme Court excepted from this general proscription suits to enjoin state
officials from enforcing unconstitutional legislation. 35 In Thompson v.
Shapiro,36 a three-judge district court addressed briefly the contention
31. See note 8 supra for the text of the amendment. The adoption of the eleventh amendment, which followed closely the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.)
419 (1793), was motivated by the belief that the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity should
apply to the states. See Note, Sovereign Immunity in Suits To Enjoin the Enforcement of Unconstitutional Legislation, 50 HARV. L. REv. 956, 957 (1937); Comment, Waiver of State Immunity
to Suit with Special Reference to Suits in Federal Courts, 45 MICH. L. REv. 348, 348-49 (1947).

For a discussion of the history and interpretation of the eleventh amendment see Cullison,
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5
HOUSTON L. REV. 1 (1967); Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation,2

GA. L. REv. 207 (1968).
32. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). A state can, of course, consent to be sued
and thus relinquish the protection of the eleventh amendment. The accepted rule has been that such
a relinquishment must be shown to be clear and unequivocal. See Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read,
322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944). But cf Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959) (both cases suggest that the strict standard required
for relinquishment has been relaxed toward a standard of implied consent). See generally
Comment, PrivateSuits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 331 (1966).
33. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1945). The
eleventh amendment does not provide immunity for counties, cities, or other lesser governmental
units. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); Markham v. City of Newport News, 292
F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961).
34. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The case arose out of a federal suit by shareholders of 9 railroads
to restrain defendant Young, the Attorney General of Minnesota, from enforcing an allegedly
unconstitutional statute reducing railroad rates. The federal court granted the requested relief and
issued a preliminary injunction over Young's objection that the suit was in fact a suit against the
state and thus foreclosed by the eleventh amendment. When Young subsequently sued in state court
for a writ of mandamus to compel the railroads' compliance with the new law, he was judged guilty
of contempt and jailed. The United States Supreme Court upheld the injunction, and Justice
Peckham announced the following rule: "The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional,
and if it be so, the use of the name of the state to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of
complainants is a proceeding without the authority of, and one which does not affect, the state in
its sovereign or governmental capacity." 209 U.S. at 159. One commentator, while pointing out
that the decision rested on "purest fiction," upholds Ex parte Young as indispensable to constitutional government and the rule of law, in that it has brought within the scope of federal judicial
review actions that might otherwise have escaped review and has subjected states to the restrictions
of the United States Constitution. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 48, at 183-86 (2d ed. 1970).
35. Accord, Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 228 (1964).
36. 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), affd, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Plaintiff brought suit
against the Connecticut Commissioner of Welfare, in his official capacity, seeking an injunction
against enforcement of the state's one-year residence requirement and payment of monies unconstitutionally withheld.
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that an award of retroactive welfare payments violated the eleventh

amendment by constituting, in effect, a suit against the state without its
consent. Interpreting Ex parte Young to hold that the eleventh amendment does not forbid suits against state officials who have acted uncon-

stitutionally, the court decided that it was not precluded from ordering
defendant welfare commissioner to tender monies he had unconstitutionally withheld. 37 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision without discussing the constitutionality of retroactive benefits.3 Only one welfare case has dealt at length with the effect of the
eleventh amendment on a federal court's power to award retroactive
benefits. In Westberry v. Fisher,39 a federal district court held that

because the conceded purpose of plaintiffs' action was to establish a
liability that ultimately would be payable out of Maine's public fisc, the
suit was directed against the state in substance and therefore was constitutionally proscribed." Moreover, the court answered plaintiffs' conten-

tion that Exparte Young and its progeny sanction the award of retroactive damages against a state by distinguishing suits to enjoin the uncon-

stitutional conduct of state officials from actions to recover money
damages for their past violations. It reasoned that, although actions of
the first type are not forbidden by the eleventh amendment,41 the Young
doctrine has never been extended by the Supreme Court to cases within
the second category; rather, when confronted with actions for damages,

the Court has adhered consistently to the strict rule that a state cannot
be sued in federal court without its consent.12 Thus the federal decisions
on the propriety of awarding retroactive welfare benefits lack uniformity, both in theory and result.43
37. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 338 n.5 (D. Conn. 1967). One of the judges
dissented from the award of money damages to plaintiff, saying that Connecticut had not consented
to be sued in an action for damages. Id. at 341 (Clarie, J., dissenting).
38. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
39. 309 F. Supp. 12 (D. Me. 1970). Westberry began as a class action by AFDC recipients
attacking the constitutionality of Maine's so-called "maximum grant" regulations. After a 3-judge
court had held that the state regulations violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, 297 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Me. 1969), the case was remanded to a single district judge
for determination of plaintiff's damage claims.
40. 309 F. Supp. at 18, citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573,
576-77 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1945).
41. 309 F. Supp. at 19, citing Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 228 (1964);
Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 303-06 (1952).
42. 309 F. Supp. at 19.
43. Disagreemqnt even exists among the courts that award retroactive payments over the
proper method of making those payments. Most cases have awarded benefits retroactively to the
entire class. E.g., Campagnuolo v. White, CCH Pov. L. REP.
1305.75 (D. Conn. Oct. 7, 1971);
Woods v. Miller, [1968-1971 Transfer binder] CCH Pov. L. REP.
13,025 (D. Nev. Mar. 19, 1971);
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The instant court initially noted that, as an instrumentality of the

federal government, it must attempt to effectuate the policies of the
United States in evaluating the parties' claims. Balancing the relative

hardships of the parties in view of the "cooperative federalism" approach of the entire federal welfare program," the court reasoned that

the increased tensions in federal-state relations which could result from
a federal court order requiring a state to expend funds against its will

outweighed the possible hardships on plaintiffs were retroactive payments not allowed. Consequently, the court held that the district court's
award of retroactive welfare benefits, when measured by the restraining
"principles of equity, comity, and federalism,"45 constituted an improper exercise of its equity powers. Turning next to the question of state
immunity under the eleventh amendment, the court reasoned that be-

cause past Supreme Court affirmances of decisions awarding retroactive
benefits had not addressed specifically the issue of federal court power
to order such relief," it was free to decide this question for itself. The
court then distinguished between an injunctive decree and one that establishes a liability to be satisfied from state monies. While the former
merely conditions the state's future receipt of federal funds on state
officials' compliance with federal standards, the court noted, the latter
actually requires an affirmative act from the state itself-the expendi-

ture of state funds to make restitution for its agents' past wrongs-and
is therefore no different from an award of damages in a suit against the
state itself.47 Thus, the court held that the district court's retroactive
award of public assistance benefits in the instant case, aside from being
an improvident exercise of the court's equity powers, was foreclosed by
the eleventh amendment.
Doe v. Hursh, 337 F. Supp. 614 (D. Minn. 1970); Ojeda v. Hackney, 319 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Tex.
1970); Brooks v. Yeatman, 311 F. Supp. 364 (M.D. Tenn. 1970); Baxter v. Birkins, 311 F. Supp.
222 (D. Colo. 1970). Other courts have awarded retroactive payments to the named plaintiffs only
in a class action, e.g., Machado v. Hackney, 299 F. Supp. 644 (W.D. Tex. 1969), vacated, 397
U.S. 593 (1970), and one 3-judge court remanded to a single district judge with instructions to
consider a retroactive order, Alvarado v. Schmidt, 317 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Wis. 1970). Finally,
some courts have declined to rule on the issue of retroactivity, instead remanding to the state
welfare agency for its determination in line with established procedures. E.g., Grubb v. Sterrett,
315 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Solman v. Shapiro, 300 F. Supp. 409 (D. Conn.), affd, 396
U.S. 5 (1969); cf. Robinson v. Washington, 302 F. Supp. 842 (D.D.C. 1968). See generally
Fontaine, supra note 21, at 43-47.
44. See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
45. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972).
46. But cf. McDonald v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 430 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1970).
47. Relying on the rule that a state's waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity must be
clear and unequivocal, see note 32 supra, the instant court also rejected plaintiffs' contention that
New York had waived its immunity in accepting federal funds under the Social Security Act for
use in its welfare program.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

The instant decision marks the first time that a federal court has
articulated both discretionary and mandatory limitations on its own
power to award retroactive welfare payments. In light of the largely
undeveloped state of the law of welfare remedies, both of the case's
holdings seem likely to be followed by other federal courts." The court's
weighing of the competing claims to deny retroactive payments seems
supportable as a proper exercise of its equitable powers in this instance,
especially given the threatened administrative and financial burden on
the state and the likelihood that a retroactive award might have deprived
current recipients of needed funds. In support of its conclusion, however, the court has provided a rationale that, if followed by other courts,
may unduly favor the state's position and prevent any truly equitable
resolution of the parties' interests. Specifically, the instant court's articulation of the congressional policy of "cooperative federalism" as a
background for weighing the relative hardships of the parties may persuade other courts to defer to the decisions of state welfare administrators; in this era of burgeoning welfare rolls and inadequate state budgets, courts are likely to welcome the cooperative federalism approach
as a practical judicial response to social and political exigencies. The
danger with this approach is its overemphasis on the policy of federalstate cooperation at the expense of a second fundamental goal of congressional welfare policy-satisfaction of the ascertained needs of impoverished persons. Thus, although the instant court did briefly consider
this goal in weighing the parties' interest, 49 its rationale may nevertheless
lead other courts to forego the necessary balancing of these often conflicting congressional policies. Several more difficult problems exist
with the court's alternative holding. The court undoubtedly could have
disposed of plaintiffs' claim solely on the ground that the district court
order was an improvident exercise of the court's general equity jurisdiction; other courts have resolved this problem without proceeding to the
eleventh amendment issue.5" Thus the court's alternative holding-that
the federal courts are constitutionally precluded from awarding retroactive relief-was apparently motivated by a desire to establish precedent
in this newly developing area with the hope of ending the Supreme
Court's silence on the retroactive benefits issue. Nevertheless, assuming
arguendo that the eleventh amendment holding was indispensable to the
48. In a recent federal case, the court denied on eleventh amendment grounds a retroactive
award of wrongfully withheld welfare payments, declaring itself "persuaded by, and in full agreement with, the recent decision in Rothstein v. Wyman .
Like v. Carter, 41 U.S.L.W. 2406
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 6, 1973).
49. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 235 (2d Cir. 1972).
50. E.g., Bryant v. Carleson, 465 F.2d I1I, 113-14 (9th Cir. 1972).
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court's disposition of the instant case, that holding can be attacked on

several grounds. First, a retroactive award of welfare payments can be
viewed not as damages against the state for its violation of federal law

but rather as an integral part of the court's injunctive relief, intended
to restore the plaintiffs to their former condition." Thus, by considering

a claim for retroactive benefits as merely incidental to a petition for
injunctive relief, federal courts can award such relief without violating
the eleventh amendment, under the authority of Ex parte Young and its

progeny." The instant court's eleventh amendment holding is most susceptible to attack, however, when it is analyzed in terms of its possible
ramifications. The court's holding, when viewed broadly, forecloses, in
any nonconsensual suit by an individual, a federal court judgment that
requires the payment of money from state funds. In an era when the
recognition of constitutional rights by federal courts increasingly requires the allocation of public resources, 3 this interpretation would
often render plaintiffs remediless in suits challenging allegedly unlawful
state practices; and, by protecting unconstitutional "state action" from
the full judicial power of the United States, the court's holding ultimately sets up the eleventh amendment in opposition to the fourteenth."
51. In Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals awarded back pay to black teachers whose contracts had not been
renewed when the school system desegregated, in violation of their fourteenth amendment rights.
The court considered the plaintiffs' prayer for back pay not as a claim for damages, but as "an
integral part of the equitable remedy of injunctive reinstatement." Id. at 324. See also I J.
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 112(2) (5th ed. 1941).
52. Levy, supra note 20, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. at 331, 350-51; see Fontaine, supra note
2 1, at 55-56. In one welfare case, the district court, while declining to award retroactive payments,
noted that it theoretically could condition its order to require the state to refund its federal AFDC
monies unless it awarded the withheld benefits retroactively. Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173,
1196 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
53. See generally Comment, Enforcement of Judicial Financing Orders: Constitutional
Rights in Search of a Remedy, 59 GEo. L.J. 393 (1970); G. Sanders, Reallocation of Public
Resources Necessitated by the Court Ordered Recognition of Constitutional Rights, January, 1973
(unpublished paper, Vanderbilt Univ. School of Law). For recent federal decisions requiring the
expenditure of state funds in protection of plaintiffs' constitutional rights see Bradley v. Milliken,
Civ. A. No. 35257 (E.D. Mich. July II, 1972) (Order for Acquisition of Transportation) (state
ordered to bear cost of additional buses acquired to implement unitary school system); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (state officials ordered to implement courtestablished medical and constitutional minimum standards in treating patients at mental institutions).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides in part: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." One commentator suggests that
the conflict between the eleventh and fourteenth amendments could have been avoided by a ruling
in Ev parte Young that the fourteenth amendment had the effect of overruling the eleventh. Note,
supra note 31, at 961. That decision explicitly found, however, that each amendment existed in
full force. Fx parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908).
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Furthermore, since it partially immunizes a state official who violates
"the supreme law of the land," the instant court's view of state immunity appears inconsistent with the fundamental principles of
constitutional government embodied in the supremacy clause.55 The tra-

ditional doctrine of sovereign immunity has been subjected to vigorous
criticism,56 and that criticism is no less justified when the doctrine is
embodied in the form of the eleventh amendment. Thus, the Supreme
Court, when it eventually undertakes the balancing process necessary to

resolve the conflict between these constitutional provisions, may well
restrict the scope of the eleventh amendment, possibly limiting its immunity to cases in which no federal right is involved.," Whether upheld
on the equity jurisdiction or the eleventh amendment theory, however,
the instant decision represents a distinct impediment to the ability of
potential welfare plaintiffs to secure full redress. While the decision in
no way affects the availability of prospective relief to the litigant who
challenges the legality of state welfare administration, it does diminish
considerably his chances for obtaining retroactively the benefits that had
been wrongfully withheld. Of course, the welfare litigant can circumvent
this problem by bringing his action for retroactive relief in the state
courts, or by seeking a "fair hearing"58 before the state welfare department to determine whether he is entitled to a retroactive award of

benefits. Either option, however, would require relinquishing the numerous advantages of proceeding in federal court,59 where welfare plaintiffs
traditionally have enjoyed their greatest success. Thus, should the instant decision be widely accepted, it will result in welfare plaintiffs'
having a right without a remedy in the federal courts.*
55. See Note, supra note 31, at 962; cf Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S.
239 (1931): "Cases discussing the question of what constitutes a suit against the State within the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. . .have no bearing upon the power of this Court to protect
rights secured by the federal Constitution." Id. at 246 n.5 (Brandeis, J.) (dictum).
56. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 131, at 984-87 (4th ed. 1971).
57. Even if the instant court's interpretation of the eleventh amendment is upheld, its holding
can be attacked on the ground that the state effectively consented to suit in the federal courts. In
light of recent Supreme Court decisions relaxing the strict standard for relinquishment of eleventh
amendment rights, see note 32 supra and cases therein cited, a state's acceptance of federal funds
for use in its federally regulated welfare program can be interpreted as an implied waiver of its
immunity. See generally Comment, supra note 32. But cf Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (a state's mere participation in a federal grant-in-aid program does not constitute
a waiver of eleventh amendment immunity).
58. The "fair hearing" requirement is set out in 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1972). See U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PLANS
UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 2 (1971).
59. See generally Note, supra note 15.
* After the preparation of this Comment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed a lower court decision that awarded retroactive payments, from state funds, of
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Taxation-Valuation-Income-Producing Lease of Undeveloped Airspace Is Real Property Interest That May
Be Assessed Separately for Taxation
Petitioners purchased a lot in Baltimore City that was subject to a
lease of the airspace superjacent to it.1 The lessee, owner of a multistory

office building situated on a lot adjacent to petitioner's, had obtained
the lease to guarantee access to light and air. 2 The city board of assessments assessed the value of the air rights lease for taxation purposes on
the ground that income-producing air rights constitute a separate classification of taxable real property. Petitioners contended that under the
state constitution3 air rights are not taxable as a class or subclass of
real property and asserted that because fee owners who utilize their own
air rights are not assessed and taxed separately on those air rights,
owners who lease their air rights should not be assessed separately
either.' The local Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals vacated the
assessment, but the Maryland Tax Court reversed and reinstated the

assessment. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, held,
affirmed. An income-producing lease of undeveloped airspace is an interest in real property that can be assessed separately for the purpose
of taxation. Macht v. Department of Assessments, No. 16 (Md. Ct.
App., Nov. 8, 1972).

The property owner's rights in the airspace above his land5 are
based on the common-law doctrine "to whomsoever the soil belongs, he
public assistance benefits withheld in violation of federal time-processing requirements. Denying
appellants' contention that the suit for retroactive welfare benefits could not be maintained in
federal court because it was barred by the eleventh amendment, the court expressly rejected the
Second Circuit's reasoning in the instant case. Jordan v. Weaver, 41 U.S.L.W. 2406 (7th Cir. Jan.
18, 1973). This direct conflict between the 2 circuits should substantially increase the likelihood of
Supreme Court review of the instant case.
1. A small building about 100 feet tall was situated on the lot. The lease covered the airspace
above the height of 124 feet.
2. The term of the lease was 98 years, 9 months. The rent was fixed at twice the annual real
estate taxes imposed on the entire property of the lessor-including land, improvements, and
airspace-less the increase in taxes attributable to the lessor's predecessor. Rent was not to be in
excess of $8,000 or less than $2,000 in calendar years 1962-70.
3. The Maryland Constitution provides that "the General Assembly shall, by uniform rules,
provide for the separate assessment, classification and sub-classification of land, improvements on
land . . . and all taxes . . . shall be uniform within each class or sub-class of land, improvements
on land . . . which the respective taxing powers may have directed to be subjected to the tax levy
....MD. ANN. CODE, Declaration of Rights, art. 15 (repl. vol. 1972).
4. The amount of the valuation was not at issue.
5. For a general history of airspace law see R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE (1968).
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owns also to the sky and to the depths."' Recognition of this principle
by American courts was first manifested by their authorization of trespass and ejectment actions for intrusions into the owner's airspace. 7 The
courts later concluded that airspace rights constituted an interest in real
property of sufficient quality to be reserved,8 vested in adjoining property owners when vacated by the governmental owner,9 or taken by
eminent domain.10 Upon this foundation, the advent of aviation brought

assertions from property owners that continual invasion of their airspace by overflying aircraft amounted to the taking of an easement.,,
In United States v. Causby, however, the Supreme Court held that a

landowner owns only as much of the space above the ground as he can
occupy or use in connection with the land.12 The railroads were the first
to convey air rights in their efforts to sell and lease the airspace above
railroad tracks in the large urban areas. 3 The Park Avenue Develop-

ment in New York City, for example, was built in leased airspace above
the New York Central Railroad right of way. 4 Moreover, in Chicago,
airspace was purchased from the Chicago Union Station Company for
the construction of the Chicago Daily News Building. 5 Taxation of
developed air rights quickly followed the recognition that the rights
could be conveyed profitably. The Cook County, Illinois board of assessors, in 1929, valued the air rights of the Merchandise Mart for taxation
purposes"6 by subtracting the total of the construction cost of the build6.

Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos. 2 BLACKSTONE,

18 (Lewis ed. 1902);

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

COMMENTARIES

453 (4th ed. rev. 1968).

7. E.g., Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906) (ejectment allowed
for stringing telephone wires over owner's land without surface contact). See also Annot., 42
A.L.R. 945 (1926).
8. E.g., Pearson v. Matheson, 102 S.C. 377, 86 S.E. 1063 (1915) (reservation in deed from
A to B limiting B's right to build to 14 feet held valid).
9. E.g., Taft v. Washington Mut. Say. Bank, 127 Wash. 503, 221 P. 604 (1923) (airspace 16
feet above alley vested in adjoining property owners when vacated by city).
10. E.g., Metropolitan West Side Elevated R.R. v. Springer, 171 II1. 170,49 N.E. 416 (1897)
(erection of support pillars one foot into alley was a compensable taking).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
12. Id. at 264. According to the Court, the concept of usable airspace includes that amount
of space above the area actually occupied, the invasion of which would cause a direct and immediate interference with the owner's full enjoyment and exploitation of the property.
13. Four specific methods were developed, including the lease, fee conveyance with support
easements, fee conveyance in both airspace and supports, and fee simple conveyance with easements back for surface usage. Note, Conveyance and Taxation of Air Rights, 64 COLUM. L. REv.
338, 346-47 (1964).
14. Brennan, Lots of Air-A Subdivision in the Sky, 1955 A.B.A. REAL PROP., PROD. &
TR. LAW SECTION

15.
16.

24.

Schmidt, Public Utility Air Rights, 54 A.B.A. REPORTS 839, 849 (1929).
Id. at 855.

RECENT CASES

1973]

ing and the loss in value due to the loss of rentable airspace from the
value of the entire fee. 7 The attorneys for the assessor decided, however,8
that air rights were not assessable until they were actually developed.'
Development, in this context, implies some form of construction in the
airspace to which a value can be attached. Thus, although there is a
historical justification for evaluation and taxation of developed air
rights,' no precedent exists for assessment and taxation of undeveloped
air rights." Taxation of undeveloped, but income-producing air rights
has been advocated by commentators, 2' but this issue has not yet been
addressed by any court.
Recognizing at the outset that under Maryland law2 ownership of
land incorporates rights in usable superjacent airspace, the court undertook a consideration of petitioner's two major arguments. Petitioners
argued first that the city had no authority to value and assess air rights
as a class or subclass of real property. In response to this contention,
the court observed that the state constitution grants the General Assembly the power to provide for classifications and subclassifications of real
property,2' and pursuant to that authority specific statutory provisions
have been enacted that permit separate assessment of buildings, im24
provements, and separate ownership of surface and mineral rights.
Petitioners contended that these sections, by enumerating the circumstances under which separate assessments are permitted for less than full
interests in property, excluded authorization for other separate assessments by implication. The court rejected the propounded rule of statutory construction-that the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the
other 25-and held that the existence of specific provisions authorizing
26
separate assessments does not preclude other separate assessments.
17.

Id. at 855-56.

18. Id. at 856. But see Note, supra note 13, at 352.
19. R. WRIGHT, supra note 5,at 305-41. See generally Hall, Harper & Leyden, Approaches
to the Valuation of Air Rights, 24 APPRAISAL J. 325 (1956); Machen, Air Rights Development,
34 APPRAISAL J. 288 (1966).
20. Note, supra note 13, at 338-39, 350-53.
21. H. BABCOCK, APPRAISAL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 87 (1968). Some commentators
note, however, that state laws may have to be amended to permit this action. Crawford, Some
Legal Aspects of Air Rights and Land Use, 25 FED. B.J. 167, 174 (1965).

22. MD. ANN. CODE art. IA, § 7 (1968 repl. vol.).
23. See note 3 supra.
24. "In valuing and assessing real estate, the land itself and the buildings or other improvements thereon shall be valued and assessed separately . ...
"In the case of separate ownership of the surface of land and of minerals or mineral rights
MD. ANN. CODE
make separate rate assessments .
therein, the assessing authority may ..
art. 81, § 19a (1972 Supp.).
25. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 906 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
26. The court rejected petitioner's argument that State Tax Comm'n v. Gales, 222 Md. 543,
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Moreover, the court explained that it was not persuaded that the assessment in question constituted a classification at all." Petitioner founded
his second argument on the proposition, which was conceded by the city,
that if the building owners had purchased the air rights, they would not
have been subject to a separate assessment. Therefore, petitioners contended that the city could not subject only air rights leased to another

for the other's benefit to a separate assessment, and, even if the city
could tax these rights separately, the sum of the assessments for "land"
and "air rights," when air rights are leased, should not exceed the
valuation of similar property when the air rights are owned by the fee
owners and used for their own benefit. The court distinguished the two
situations on the ground that a lease of airspace generates income,

whereas the fee owner's use of his own undeveloped air rights does not.
According to the court's reasoning, when petitioners relinquished unrestricted use of their airspace for a price, the airspace assumed a value
for assessment purposes. Finally, the court observed that the nature of

the rights and obligations of the parties implied a negative easement for
a term of years rather than a lease. Rejecting petitioner's argument that
under Maryland law an appurtenant easement is not assessable separately from the servient estate," the court held that for tax purposes the
value of the easement is includable as a separate element in the valua-

tion of the servient estate.
Although the instant case has primary significance for Maryland,
it presents problems that are common to many jurisdictions. Since most
2
states do not have specific statutory provisions for air rights taxation,
reported as State Tax Comm'n v. Wakefield, 161 A.2d 676 (1960) supported their position. That
case held unconstitutional an act directing that land used for agricultural purposes be valued as
such for assessment. The court explained that Gales only had declared the effort to value agricultural land differently from similar land used for other purposes constitutionally invalid. The case
did not stand for the proposition that any subclassification is invalid.
27. The dissent claimed that the city assessment department had created a classification or
subclassification of land, thus exercising a power that had been reserved solely to the General
Assembly.
28. Hill v. Williams, 104 Md. 595, 65 A. 413 (1906). The majority concluded that Hill stood
for the proposition that the value of the easement is includable in the assessment. The dissent noted
that such a characterization of the holding in Hill ignored the instant issue. Petitioners did not
argue that the city could not include the value of the air rights lease in the assessment, but only
that it could not be separately assessed. The dissent maintained that the court in Hill had held
that easements are not assessable separately and thus that that decision was determinative even if
the majority persisted in characterizing the lease as an easement. See text accompanying note 31
infra.
29. The state statutes governing air rights are generally similar to the Maryland law and do
not deal with assessment specifically. See R. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 108-11; Subcommittee of
Comm. on New Developments in Real Estate Practice, Recent Developments in Airspace
Utilization, 5 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 347, 354-56 (1970).
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the validity of efforts to tax these rights will depend first on statutory
interpretation of existing legislation. For the states to assess undeveloped air rights, the courts will have to construe authorization statutes
broadly and reject, as the instant court did, the rule of statutory construction that excludes all classification not specifically mentioned in the
statute. If, on the other hand, some jurisdictions adopt a stricter interpretation of the statute, 3 legislative amendments will be necessary to
authorize taxation. Secondly, the state courts may find it difficult to
characterize correctly the nature of the various interests in the air rights.
In the instant case, the parties intended to lease the air rights, but the
court chose to classify the interest created as an easement. Certainly the
lease accomplished the same purpose as a light and air easement, but
under Maryland law easements are not separately taxable,3 while
leases are. This unfortunate scrambling of terms may have serious tax
consequences in other states that have enacted similar taxing statutes.
Courts addressing this problem in the future should define clearly the
interest of each party in the air rights, so that the tax consequences of
the classifications will bear a rational relationship to the general property rights and duties of the parties. Although the instant case is one of
first impression, recent history demonstrates that as population density
increases in the urban areas, greater use of airspace will be necessary
and the value of airspace rights to property owners will be enhanced. 2
Airspace will then be sold, leased, and subjected to less than full ownership interests like any other real property. When this interest becomes
income-producing, there is really no reason why it should not be assessed separately just as income-producing oil, gas, and subsurface interests have been subjected to separate assessment and taxation. In each
instance, an interest in the property produces income to the fee owner,
regardless of his uses of the other interests. The majority in the instant
case, however, overlooked one of the dangers inherent in separate assessment of air rights-failure to consider the diminution in the value
of the other interests resulting from the restriction imposed on the use
of the airspace. Separate assessment of any interest usually will imply
a concomitant decline in the value of one or more of the other property
30. See, e.g., In re City of New York v. Schwartz, 36 App. Div.2d 402, 320 N.Y.S.2d 983
(Sup. Ct. 1971) (the fact that an interest is a real property interest for some purposes does not
mean ipso facto that it is subject to assessment without specific statutory authorization for a
specific assessment); Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, I N.C. App. 133, 160 S.E.2d 128
(N.C. Ct. App. 1968) (tax statutes are to be strictly construed against the state).
31. See note 28 supra.
32. See Morris, Air Rights are "Fertile Soil," I URBAN LAW. 247 (1969); Wright, Airspace
Utilization on Highway Rights of Way, 55 IOWA L. REv. 761 (1970).
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interests. In the instant case, for example, it could be argued that the
diminution in value to the surface and first 124 feet of airspace-the
unleased airspace-can be measured by the value of the rent required
by the lease.33 Failure to consider the loss in value to the fee thus could
subject the fee owner to a higher total assessment if both the fee and
the air rights are assessed separately. Therefore, although incomeproducing air rights should be assessed separately, other considerations
must be evaluated in determining the value of the total property assess-

ment.

34

Workmen's Compensation-Recreational InjuriesInjuries to Resident Employee During Off-Duty, Off-

Premises Activity Held Compensable as Within the
Course of Employment
Claimant, a resident-employee at a summer camp, sought workmen's compensation benefits for injuries received while engaged in offduty recreational activities away from his employer's premises.1 Claimant contended that the injury occurred as a result of activity known and
permitted by the employer and that it was compensable because the

activity engaged in was a reasonable incident of his employment.2 The
employer asserted that the injury occurred on the employee's own time,
away from the employer's premises, and was not related to the employ33. Dissenting opinion at 5.
34. The recommendations favoring separate assessment of air rights by the Joint Development Statute and the Model Airspace Act support this conclusion and perhaps lend greater substance to predictions that the decision by the instant court is a harbinger of future decisions in other
states. See Report, supra note 29, at 364; Subcommittee of Comm. on New Developments in Real
Estate Practice, A Model Airspace Code, 6 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 259, 264 (1971).
I. The employer was a nonprofit organization which operated a summer camp approximately 30 miles from New York City. Claimant was a 16-year-old boy who was hired as a junior
counselor at the camp. He was required to live at the camp, serve food, wash dishes, and clean the
kitchen in return for room and board and an incentive bonus at the end of the season. In July,
1968, claimant went home to New York City during a 3-day break in camp sessions but was
instructed to return on Sunday night to prepare for the next session. Upon his return, he and some
fellow employees walked to a neighboring camp, entered the recreation hall, and participated in
acrobatics during which time claimant injured his left knee. Brief for Employer-Respondent at 4,
Brief for Workmen's Compensation Board-Appellant at 3, 4, Di Perri v. Boys Bhd. Republic, 31
N.Y.2d 215, 286 N.E.2d 897, 335 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1972) (4-3 decision).
2. Evidence showed that claimant and other employees had used the recreation hall on
previous occasions, although it was not found that the employer had expressly given permission
for them to do so. The employer knew of the practice and did not expressly forbid it. Di Perri v.
Boys Bhd. Republic, 31 N.Y.2d 215, 217, 286 N.E.2d 897, 899, 335 N.Y.S.2d 405, 407 (1972).
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ment. The New York Workmen's Compensation Board awarded compensation. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed and
dismissed the claim, holding that there was no connection between the
injury and any risk incident to the employment.3 On appeal to the New
York Court of Appeals, held, reversed and award reinstated. When an
employee required to live away from home is injured while engaged in
off-duty, off-premises recreational activities within the knowledge of his
employer, his injury results from reasonable recreation incident to the
employment and is compensable. Di Perri v. Boys Brotherhood
Republic, 31 N.Y.2d 215, 286 N.E.2d 897, 335 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1972).
Under the traditional basis for federal and state workmen's compensation laws, an employee is entitled to recover benefits for personal
injuries received in an accident "arising out of and in the course of
employment." 4 "Arising out of" usually requires either some causal
connection between the accident and the performance of some duty of
the employment or between the accident and some risk incidental to the
employment.' "In the course of" requires that the injured employee be
in a place authorized by the employer and engaged in some duty of his
employment or some act incidental to it when the injury occurs.' Recreational accidents present difficult problems under this standard. Any
causal connection between the employment and the injury is often tenuous, and usually the employee is not performing any specific duty of
his employment when he is injured. Therefore, compensation for recreational injuries to regular employees 7 has been awarded sparingly by
3.

Di Perri v. Boys Bhd. Republic, 37 App. Div. 2d 317, 325 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1971).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 10 (McKinney 1965). At least 41 states and
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1971) have used this standard
formula, adopted from the English workmen's compensation laws. 6 Edw. 7 c.58 (1906); 1 A.
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 at 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LARSON].
The difficulty of applying these tests is discussed in Bernstein, The Need for Reconsidering
the Role of Workmen's Compensation, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 992, 997 (1971); see Bohlen, A Problem
in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L. REV. 328, 329 (1912).
5. See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423-25 (1923) (employee hit
by train while traveling to work; compensation awarded); Groom v. Cardillo, 119 F.2d 697, 699
(D.C. Cir. 1941) (bank employee suffered relapse of old illness; compensation denied); Security
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wakefield, 108 F.2d 273,274 (5th Cir. 1939) (plant employee died from accidental
poisoning; compensation denied).
6. This requirement derived from an English case and first appeared in this country in the
decision of Wickham v. Glenside Woolen Mills, 252 N.Y. 11, 12-13, 168 N.E. 446 (1929). But see
Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial Accidents Here and Abroad, 42
CALIF. L. REV. 531 (1954).
7. In this context, a regular employee is a typical worker who lives in his own residence and
commutes daily to his employment. A resident-employee is one who as a part of his employment
lives on his employer's premises.

4.

N.Y.
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many courts.' Courts faced with recreational injury cases usually require
the presence of one or more factors before compensation will be
awarded: the injury must have occurred on the employer's premises
during a lunch or recreational break; the employee must have been
required, expressly or impliedly, to participate in the activity; or the
recreation must have been of some benefit to the employer beyond
simple improvement in employee morale or health? These requirements, however, are not always applied strictly in cases dealing with
injuries to employees who are required to reside away from their homes.
Courts have been less exacting when the employment entails travel away
from their homes, because the risks that accompany travel continue

beyond periods of actual business activity. Courts are most liberal in
allowing compensation in cases that involve employees required to reside on the employer's premises, because of the employee's mandatory

exposure to the dangers created by a particular location." In deciding
how far to extend workmen's compensation to resident-employees,

courts usually consider whether the injury was caused by some circumstance peculiar to the employment situation." A number of courts have

upheld compensation awards to resident-employees who suffered recreational injuries. These courts weigh such surrounding circumstances as
8. Note, Recreational Injuries and Workmen's Compensation; Infusion of Comnnon-Law,
Agency-Tort Concepts, 34 IND. L.J. 310, 314 (1958); 51 IowA L. REV. 531, 533 (1966).
9. LARSON, supra note 5, § 22.00, at 349; see, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d 512, 247 P.2d 697 (1952) (report employee drowned in lake where
employer had never expressly permitted swimming; compensation denied); Pacheco v. Orchids of
Hawaii, 502 P.2d 1399 (Hawaii 1972) (employee killed while driving to bank during authorized
coffee break; compensation granted); Hydro-Line Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 III. 2d 156,
154 N.E.2d 234 (1958) (employee injured on totally voluntary baseball team; compensation denied); Ethen v. Franklin Mfg. Co., 286 Minn. 371, 176 N.W.2d 72 (1970) (employee injured at
voluntary company picnic; compensation denied); Tedesco v. General Elec. Co., 305 N.Y. 544, 114
N.E.2d 33 (1953) (compensation awarded to employee while playing on company-subsidized team);
Clevenger v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (auto salesman injured
at company picnic; directed verdict for insurer); cf Exparte Blackmon, 270 So. 2d 108 (Ala. 1972)
(nonresident maintenance employee killed during paid lunch hour; compensation denied); Kohlmayer v. Keller, 24 Ohio St. 2d 10, 263 N.E.2d 231 (1970) (employee injured neck at picnic
designed to promote employee good will; compensation awarded).
10. See LARSON, supra note 5, § 24.00, at 421.
11. Lepow v. Lepow Knitting Mills, 288 N.Y. 377, 379-80, 43 N.E.2d 450, 451-52 (1942)
(employee died of insect bite). Risks that are common to the public in general are not usually
compensable. Cf Underhill v. Keenan, 258 N.Y. 543, 180 N.E. 325 (1931) (hotel cook fell down
steps; compensation denied). But see Behan v. County of Onondaga, 26 App. Div. 2d 579, 220
N.E.2d 815, 274 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1966) (resident jail matron slipped on tile floor; compensation
awarded).
An employee who may live on the employer's premises, but is not required to do so does not
receive the same treatment as an employee requiredto be a resident. See Groff v. Uzzilla, I App.
Div. 2d 273, 149 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1956) (restaurant cook died from fall down stairs on the way to
his quarters; compensation denied).
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the nature of the employer's premises and the recreational opportunities

available, 2 whether the employer previously had allowed such recreation,' 3 whether the injury occurred on or off the employer's premises, 4
and whether the employee was on continual call for work or had fixed
working hours.'5 The United States Supreme Court has held that, when
an employee is injured while pursuing approved recreation on the employer's premises, there is no need for a causal relation between the
injury and the employment, and that the employment need only have
exposed the employee to a "zone of special danger" from which the

injury arose.'" The Court has also upheld an award when a resident
employee was killed while away from the employer's premises, apparently finding both "course of employment" and a "zone of special dan-

ger" from the isolated nature of the job site, the employer's previous
acquiescence in personal recreational activity, and the continuously "on
call" character of the employment.17 Although the Supreme Court has
12. Dow v. Collins, 22 App. Div. 2d 250, 253, 254 N.Y.S.2d 554, 557, appeal denied, 15
N.Y.2d 487, 208 N.E.2d 790, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1964) (employee drowned while working on an
island and using employer's fishing boat; compensation granted); LARSON, supra note 5, § 24.30,
at 435.
13. See, e.g., Daniul v. Allied Chem. Corp., 35 App. Div. 2d 1053, 316 N.Y.S.2d 559 (1970)
(employee injured while playing "games" with employer's knowledge; compensation granted);
Penzara v. Maffia Bros., 282 App. Div. 790, 123 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1953), affid, 307 N.Y. 15, 119 N.E.2d
570 (1954) (employee injured while repairing his car during slack period; compensation granted).
Contra, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d 512, 516, 247 P.2d 697,
699 (1952) (resort employee drowned in lake where employer had never expressly permitted swimming; compensation denied). But see Reinert v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d 349, 353,
294 P.2d 713, 715 (1956) (camp counselor hurt in fall from horse; compensation granted).
14. See Lewis v. Knappen Tippets Abbett Eng'r Co., 304 N.Y. 461, 467, 108 N.E.2d 609,
611 (1952) (engineer sent to Israel was shot during a sight-seeing tour; compensation awarded);
Lyons v. Camp Shows, Inc., 298 N.Y. 897, 898, 84 N.E.2d 808, 809 (1949) (actor injured while
returning from trip to France; compensation granted); Scott v. Camp Shows, Inc., 298 N.Y. 896,
84 N.E.2d 808 (1949) (same; compensation granted).
15. See, e.g., deSantis v. Camp Shows, Inc., 275 App. Div. 880, 881, 88 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733,
appeal denied, 299 N.Y. 798, 87 N.E.2d 689 (1949) (USO entertainer hit by car while awaiting
orders in San Francisco; compensation granted); Tushinsky v. National Broadcasting Co., 265
App. Div. 301, 303, 38 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (1942), appeal denied, 292 N.Y. 595, 55 N.E.2d 369
(1944) (musician killed by bus between rehearsal time and concert; compensation granted); cf
Caney v. Straight, 274 App. Div. 1077, 85 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1949) (hotel cook injured during rest
period; compensation granted). Professor Larson draws a sharp distinction between recovery requirements for resident employees on call and those with fixed working hours. LARSON, supra note
5, §§ 24.20, 24.30.
16. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 507 (1951). In O'Leary, the
employer on Guam had furnished its employees with a recreation hall near the ocean shore. After
spending an afternoon in the recreation hall, an employee drowned in an attempt to save a stranger.
The Court awarded compensation. For a discussion of the expanding interpretations of causal
relationships see Henderson, Should Workmen's Compensation Be Extended to Nonoccupational
liuries?,48 TEXAS L. REv. 117, 121-25 (1969).
17. O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc., 380 U.S. 359, 363 (1965). The
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not yet decided a case involving an off-duty, off-premises recreational
accident, lower federal courts have allowed compensation to resident
employees in such circumstances. 8 These decisions place particular
emphasis upon the isolated location of the employment and the employer's prior knowledge of the recreational activity from which the

injury arose. 9 Under state law, the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court has employed much the same principles in residentemployee compensation awards.2 1 In Simon v. The Hedges,21 a dishwasher at a summer resort drowned while canoeing on his day off. The
Appellate Division awarded compensation, noting that permission to
use the lake for recreation was an inducement to employment and was
thus clearly within the course of the decedent's employment. These same
factors were emphasized in Rizzo v. Syracuse University,22 where the

Appellate Division awarded compensation to a graduate assistant assigned to a project in the Rocky Mountains who was injured while
hiking during a lull in his work.2 3 The court held that both the isolated
Court noted that the conditions of the employment created a zone where the employee had to seek
recreation under exacting and unconventional conditions (wartime Korea) and that therefore the
accident and death arose directly out of, and in, the course of employment.
18. See, e.g., Self v. Hanson, 305 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1962) (employee injured while sitting
in a parked automobile; compensation granted); Hastorf-Nettles, Inc. v. Pillsbury, 203 F.2d 641
(9th Cir. 1953) (employee in Alaska injured while returning to the job site from a trip to a city;
compensation granted). The only contrary federal court decision in this series of cases has been
the Fifth Circuit's denial of compensation in United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
299 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 918 (1963), in which a resident employee at a
missle tracking station was killed in an automobile accident while returning to the base from a
village tavern. The result in that case is questionable because, under identical facts, the Fourth
Circuit awarded compensation to a passenger in the same car in O'Hearne v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 335 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1964).
19. See Self v. Hanson, 505 F.2d 699, 702-03 (9th Cir. 1962); Hastorf-Nettles, Inc. v.
Pillsbury, 203 F.2d 641, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1953).
20. E.g., Leonard v. People's Camp, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 420, 194 N.Y.S.2d 863, aff'd, 9
N.Y.2d 652, 173 N.E.2d 46, 212 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1961) (summer camp employee drowned in lake
owned by employer; compensation awarded); Gabunas v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 279
App. Div. 697, 108 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1951) (stewardess injured while bicycling during a stopover in
Portugal; the court awarded compensation, holding that since the employee was on continual work
call, all activities she performed during stopover were within the course of employment). In Roher
v. Cherry Grove Hotel, 20 App. Div. 2d 593, 245 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1963), an employee on an island
summer resort drowned while returning from a mainland shopping trip. The court held that the
employment status continued during all normal activities-including recreation-by an employee
whose job required travel or sojourn at a distance from his home. Id. at 593, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
See Eixman v. Rothman's East Norwich Inn, 6 App. Div. 2d 911, 175 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1958)
(employee injured while returning from stroll; award upheld); Schneider v. United Whelan Drug
Stores, 284 App. Div. 1072, 135 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1954) (employee on business trip injured after
business had been completed; compensation granted).
21. 286 App. Div. 1044, 144 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1955).
22. 2 App. Div. 2d 641, 151 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1956).
23. But cf. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d 529, 247
P.2d 707 (1952) (housekeeper suffered broken leg during evening walk; compensation denied).

1973]

RECENT CASES

location of the work and previous permission by the employer for the
recreational hiking brought the activity within the course of the employ-

ment. 24 The New York Court of Appeals has not previously decided a
compensation dispute involving an off-duty, off-premises recreational
injury to a resident employee; it has, however, denied awards to traveling employees in similar circumstances. In Davis v. Newsweek
Magazine,25 the court denied compensation when the traveling employee

drowned while on a side trip from his planned route. The court conceded
that the injuries to a restricted employee during reasonable activity
should be compensable, 2 but stated that recreational injuries off the
employer's premises and after working hours were not a risk of the
employment and therefore not compensable. In Congden v. Klett,2 the

claimant, who was not a resident employee, was injured in the employer's swimming pool after working hours. Citing Davis, the Court
of Appeals held that there was an insufficient nexus between the risk of

employment and the off-duty, off-premises injury to make it compensable.28 Finally, in Kaplan v. Zodiac Watch Co., 29 the Court of Appeals
held that there was no "work-related injury" when a traveling salesman
was injured while hurriedly dressing in his hotel room."
The majority in the instant case rejected each of the two bases
relied upon by the Appellate Division in its dismissal of the award. In
rejecting the theory that the injury was not compensable unless the
activity either occurred on the employer's premises, was required by the
employer, or benefited the employer in some material way, the instant

court found the Congden rationale inapplicable to resident-employee
24. The court did not directly discuss the fact that the injury occurred off the employer's
premises.
25. 305 N.Y. 20, 110 N.E.2d 406 (1953).
26. Id. at 26, 110 N.E.2d at 408. See Motto v. Cosmpolitan Tourist Co., 278 App. Div. 597,
101 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1951) (bus driver required to wait for fishing party was injured while accompanying the group; compensation granted); Block v. Camp Shows, Inc., 272 App. Div. 980, 72
N.Y.S.2d 681, appeal denied, 297 N.Y. 1032, 77 N.E.2d 523 (1947) (theater manager injured in
route to nearby town for haircut; award granted).
27. 307 N.Y. 218, 120 N.E.2d 796 (1954).
28. In denying the award, the court noted that a contrary holding would lead to an absurd
result. "If that is deemed a sufficient nexus between the employment and the injury, then one may
say that in the ordinary effort of living, a man continually makes himself ready for his employer's
service and thus should be compensated for whatever injury befalls him." Id. at 222, 120 N.E.2d
at 798.
29. 20 N.Y.2d 537, 232 N.E.2d 625, 285 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1967).
30. Id. at 540, 232 N.E.2d at 626, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 587. The court noted that dressing was
an activity common to all people and was in no way attributable to a particular incident of
employment and was not compensable. See Paduano v. New York Workmen's Comp. Bd., 25
N.Y.2d 669, 254 N.E.2d 776, 306 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1969) (compensation denied when traveling
employee had slipped in a shower).
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cases and limited its rule to employees who work regular hours and who
live at home.3 ' The majority reasoned that when the employee was
required to remain in a particular place for a specified length of time,
an injury resulting from reasonable recreational activity is still compensable although technically not occurring on the employer's premises.
The court used earlier New York cases such as Simon and Rizzo to
demonstrate that compensation previously had been granted when recreational injuries had occurred on land not owned by the employer. The
court went on to state that even if recovery were limited to those cases
in which the injury occurred on the premises, the instant award would
have to stand because the adjacent camp became an "incidental adjunct" to the employer's premises because of the prior permitted use of
the facilities." In rejecting the second theory-that the recreational
activity in the instant case was purely personal and not compensable as
part of the employment-the court found that, unlike the situation in
Kaplan, the work environment in the instant case was an integral part
of the entire occurrence, since the employee was entitled to recreation
but was confined in a remote area and secluded from most forms of
entertainment.13 The court concluded that under the "reasonable activity" test stated in Davis, 34 the risk inherent in the recreational activ35
ity was an incident of the instant claimant's employment. The dissent
maintained that the majority had relied too much on a change in environment. Although it agreed with the majority that some allowances are
to be made for injuries to employees living away from home, the dissent
reasoned that this factor alone does not make all accidents compensable
per se. The dissent stated that regardless of where the employee lives, a
recreational injury occurring off the employer's premises and on the
employee's own time is not compensable even if the activity was sanctioned by the employer. The dissent concluded that there must be a
causal relation between the accident and the new environment before
any compensation may be awarded and that such a connection was not
sufficiently shown in the instant case.
By emphasizing the distinction between the stricter standards for
31. The Appellate Division's first ground for dismissing the claimant's award relied heavily
upon the Congden rationale. 37 App. Div. 2d at 319, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
32. 31 N.Y.2d at -, 286 N.E.2d at 901, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 410. The point was suggested
earlier in Presiding Judge Herlihy's dissent in the Appellate Division decision of the case. 37 App.
Div. 2d at 320, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (Herlihy, J., dissenting).
33. The second basis for the Appellate Division's dismissal of the compensation award drew
from the language of Kaplan. 37 App. Div. 2d at 319, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
34. 305 N.Y. at 28, 110 N.E.2d at 409.
35. Three justices dissented from the majority opinion.
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recovery by a nonresident employee who has regular working hours and
the employee who must live on the employer's premises, the instant
court has taken an extremely broad view of the degree and nature of
the risks that should be included in a resident employee's course of
employment. The decision indicates that such a claimant can recover for
injuries arising out of most permitted activities performed while living
at the job situs, unless it can be shown that the activity was unreasonable
under the circumstances or was of such a purely personal nature that
any person would be performing the activity regardless of location. By
refusing to apply the traveling employee analogy relied upon by the
Appellate Division in the present case, the Court of Appeals apparently
indicated its conclusion that there is not a sufficient similarity between
traveling and resident employee situations to place the same restraints
on recovery used by the court in cases such as Davis. It would be
difficult, however, to justify a distinction between a compensation award
to a resident-employee under the instant facts and the denial of an award
to a traveling employee at the camp under identical circumstances,
solely because of his status as a traveling employee. Perhaps a more
basic distinction between traveling and resident employees in the Court
of Appeals cases is not the employee's status as a resident as such, but
the degree of isolation from most conventional forms of recreation
imposed on him by his employment. Even an employee required to
travel to distant communities is more likely to encounter a larger, hence
safer, variety of recreational opportunities than the resident employee
required to remain in one remote area. This isolation may be a sufficient
factor to justify the instant court's expansion of "arising out of and in
the course of employment" to include the risks inherent in the limited
recreation available in the employment vicinity. Thus, injury from a
recreational activity within the knowledge of an employer, even though
it occurs while the employee is technically off-premises and off-duty,
should be an inherent risk in the employment of a summer camp worker
and should be born by the employer. The instant decision adopts no new
test but it does represent one of the most liberal compensation awards
to date. There is a danger that the case may be distinguished on its facts,
however; the opinion creates some potential difficulties of application
because it leaves open the questions of when an activity is considered
to be within the knowledge of the employer, when an employer has
permitted a specific recreational activity, and when an activity is reasonable under the circumstances. These potential ambiguities make it difficult to predict what future courts will do when faced with similar facts.

